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THE MAGAZINE. The early numbers of the next volume will
contain articles by Lucius S. Landreth, Professor James Burr Ames,
Dean of the Harvard Law School, Professor William Draper Lewis,
Dean of the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania,
Professors George Wharton Pepper and George S. Patterson, of the
University of Pennsylvania, Professor Edward A. Harriman, of
Northwestern University, and other distinguished' writers. The
attention of our subscribers is called to the fact that the subscription
price for next year has been placed at the uniform reduced rate of
three dollars.
DAMAGES IN CONTRACT FOR MENTAL ANGUISH. In W. U
Tel. Co. v. .Mrs. . j. Hagrove, 36 S. W. Rep. 1077 (1896),
it appeared that the plaintiff's son was fatally ill ; that her
daughter-in-law went to the defendant's office at X., and left the
following message addressed to the plaintiff: "To Mrs. T. J. Har-
grove, Smithfield, Texas-Daniel is very sick. Come at once,
Maggie"; that the defendant's agent accepted the message with
pay therefor; that through his negligence in not informing himself
as to whether the company had an office at Smithfield, the message
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was not delivered, nor was the money refunded; that in conse-
quence of its non-delivery the plaintiff was unable to reach her
son's bedside before his death. Upon these facts there was a ver-
dict of $600 for the plaintiff in an action on the contract. This
was sustained by the court on the ground that the plaintiff's grief
and mental anguish caused by her failure to be at his bedside dur-
ing his last days were such as to warrant the verdict.
This case raises two questions :-first, will an action by Mrs. T.
J. Hargrove lie on the contract ?-second, is mental anguish an
element of damage?
Generally, one not a party to a contract has no rights in virtue
of that contract, though in some jurisdictions the beneficiary may
sue. The present case, however, accords with recent Texas author-
ity: see cases collected in Tel. CO. v. Wood, 57 Fed. Rep. (N. D.
Tex.) 471. The English cases hold substantially that a person to
whom a message is sent cannot maintain an action, notwithstanding
pecuniary injury may result to him by the failure of a telegraph
company to transmit it correctly or withifi a reasonable time, unless
the sender sustains to the person to whom the message is sent, the
relation of agent: Plajford v. Telegraph Conzpany, L. R. 4
Q. B. 7o6.
The true principle of recovery in such cases, according to the
weight of judicial decision, is best set forth in Shingleur v. W. &.
Tel. Co., 13 So. Rep. 425; 72 Miss. 1030 (1895), where the
Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that a telegraph company is
liable to either the sender or the sendee for damages sustained by
reason of the delivery of an altered message, to the sender in con-
tract or tort, and to the sendee in tort. (See this case for a full
list of the authorities.)
It may be suggested that since a telegraph company is a quasi
public corporation engaged in interstate commerce (Tel. Co. v.
Texas, 105 U. S. 460 [i88i]), a recovery in contract by the
addressee might be justified upon the same authority which per-
mits a recovery by the consignee in a suit against a common
carrier.
With regard to the second question, at common law no action
lay for the recovery of damages for mere mental suffering, discon-
nected from physical injury and not the result of the willful wrong
of the defendant: Tel. Co. v. Rogers (i89x), 9 So. Rep. 823;
Gahan v. Tel. Co. (1894), 59 Fed. Rep. 433; Lynch v. Knight,
9 H. L. Cas. 577; Tyer v. Tel. Co. (1893), 54 Fed. Rep. 634.
In Tel. Co. v. Wood (stra), Pardee, J., citing numerous de-
cisions, says, "The general rule that mental anguish and sufferings,
unattended by any injury to the person, resulting from simple
actionable negligence, cannot be sufficient basis for an action for
the recovery of damages, is maintained and supported by an
unbroken line of English authorities, by the conceded state
of the general law prior to the So Relle Case, 55 Texas, 308
(1881), and by the uniform decisions of the federal courts and
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decisions of the Supreme Courts of Nevada, Dakota, Kansas,
Maine, Mississippi, Georgia, Massachusetts, and by the opinions
of several text writers of unquestioned standing as expounders of
the law."
The doctrine established by the So Relle Case (supra) that
mental suffering disconnected from physical injury, may be com-
pensated for in actions for breach of contract has since been re-
peatedly reaffirmed in Texas, and it is upon this line of decisions
that the court in Tel. Co. v. Hargrove based its rulings. The
courts of Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, and Kentucky have fol-
lowed the Texas doctrine: Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 51o, 7
So. Rep. 419; Wadsworth v. Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 85 S. W.
Rep. 574; Reese v. Tel. Co., 123 Ind. 295, 24 N. E. Rep. 163;
Chapman v. Tel. CO., 13 S. W. Rep. 88o.
The deplorable consequences of the rule in the So Relle Case
are thus set forth in Tel. Co. v. Rogers (supra), per Cooper, J.
"The rapid multiplication of cases of this character in the state
of Texas since the case of So Relle indicates to some extent the
field of speculative litigation opened up by that decision, .....
Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, and Alabama, have but recently
established the rule, the dangers and difficulties of which are be-
coming apparent in Texas, the intolerant litigation invited and
appearing in Texas has not yet fairly commenced in those states.
It will, however, appear in due time, and the courts will be forced
to resort to refined limitations, as Texas has done, to restrict it.
We prefer the safety afforded by the conservatism of the old law,
as we understand it to be, and are of the opinion that no recovery
for mental suffering can be had in this case."
The federal courts have, by an unbroken line of decisions, main-
tained that such damages were damnum absque injuria : Chase v.
Tel. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 554 (189o); Tyler v. Tel. Co., 54 Fed.
Rep. 634 (1893) ; .Kesterv. Tel. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 603 (1893);
Gahanv. Tel. Co., 59 Fed. Rep. 433 (1894) ; Staffordv. Tel. Co.,
73 Fed. Rep. 273 (March, 1896).
With such eminent and overwhelming authority against the doc-
trines of the Texas cases, and remembering the mischievous con-
sequences springing from it, as well as its direct opposition to the
true principle of recovery in cases of breach of contract, it is to
be hoped that the rule will not be followed in states where it has
not already been adopted.
RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE AGAINST THE GRANTEE OF MORTGAGED
PREMISES. The conflict of decision as to the nature and extent of
the right of a mortgagee of real estate against a subsequent grantee
who by the terms of the conveyance to him has agreed to assume
and pay the mortgage, is emphasized by the recent cases on the
subject. In forris v. Nix, 46 Pac. Rep. 55, Kansas, an assump-
tion clause in a deed was held to create no liability to the mort-
gagee on the part of the grantee where his immediate grantor was.
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not liable for the mortgage. The court, in accord with the courts
of New York, New Jersey, and the United States, recognized that
the only right of the mortgagee against the grantee was the equita-
ble right of a creditor to all securities given by the principal to the
surety for the payment of the debt; in the absence of the personal
liability of the grantor, upon the sale of the mortgaged premises,
the relation as between grantor and grantee. of surety and principal
to the mortgage debt did not arise and therefore the equitable doc-
trine had no application. It is to be noted that this result is
reached in a jurisdiction which admits the right of a tfiird person
to maintain an action upon a promise made to another for his
benefit.
This decision antagonizes squarely the Pennsylvania cases which
assert the common law rule that none but the parties to a contract
or its consideration can sue upon it and yet hold that the grantee
assumes a direct liability to the mortgagee by his agreement with
the grantor, whether or not that grantor is personally liable for the
mortgage debt. In Blood v. Crew Lez'ick Co., 171 Pa. 328, 342,
it was expressly agreed in a deed to the defendants that they ac-
cepted the title to the mortgaged premises subject to certain mort-
gages. Upon this agreement, as an express covenant of indemnity,
the covenantee was allowed to collect a sum of money which he
had paid to the mortgagee for a return of his personal notes,
secured by the mortgage; the mortgagee was p--rmitted to recover
upon the ground that the agreement was an express covenant to pay
to him the amount due upon the mortgage; the court further said
it saw no reason why still another action might not be brought by
the covenantee for damages sustained by reason of the breach of
the covenant. This result of a covenantor subjected to separate
actions by different parties upon the same covenant for the
same breach is certainly anomalous. In Fireeman v. Pa. R. R.
Co., 173 Pa., 275, the plaintiff sought to charge the defend-
ants, lessees, with liability upon certain obligations of the lessor
railroad, by reason of a covenant in the lease whereby the
defendants agreed either to pay the obligations out of the
earnings of the leased road or to purchase them. It was
held, the debt having been incurred and bonds issued and
negotiated before the agreement, that the defendants had never in
any way assumed any obligation for their payment, that the plain-
tiff was not a party to the contract or its consideration, that the
contract was made for the benefit and relief of the lessor Railroad,
which alone had a right to bring an action upon it, and that the
plaintiff must look to the original debtor and the mortgage security
for the only redress he was entitled to. Disregarding precedent, it
is difficult to see why upon principle, the reasoning in this case
should not be applied with like force and effect to the facts, sub-
stantially the sume, in Blod v. Crew Lez'ick Co. (suipra).
The result of the Pennsylvania construction of agreements be-
tween the vendor and vendee of mortgaged premises is to give to a
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third party under this particular class of contracts rights in.excess
of those recognized by jurisdictions which admit the right of a
third person generally where a contract is one made for his benefit:
Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Crandall v. Payne, 154 Ill. 627.
The common sense interpretation of a clause of assumption in a
deed would seem to be, where the grantor is personally liable, that
it is a covenant of indemnity to him, and where there is no such
personal liability, that the general covenants of seizin and warranty
in the conveyance are to be understood as not extending to these
particular encumbrances: Moare's Appeal, 88 Pa. 450; King v.
Whiey, io Paige, 465.
The solution of the problem of the vendee's liability to the
mortgagee, by the use of an equitable formula applicable to cred-
itor, surety and principal debtor-asserted by eminent authority to
have obviated the difficulty of relying upon a contract relation
between the two: Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S., 61o,-has worked
out results not wholly satisfactory and consistent: Shepherdv. MAfay,
115 U. S. 505; Paine v. Jones, 76 N. Y. 274; Union Life Jns.
Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187. It is submitted that the real dif-
ficulties in this question arise from a failure or refusal to recognize
that the rights of a mortgagee against a vendee are generically the
rights of 'a stranger under a contract conferring an incidental
benefit upon him: AJfellen v. Whzpple, I Gray, 317 ; Meeck v.
Ensign, 49 Conn. IgI.
The dissenting opinion in Solicitors' Loan & Trust Co. v. Rob-
bins, 45 Pac. Rep. 39, Oregon, admits the weight of authority to
be with the majority, but maintains that upon principle the conclu-
sion that a mortgagee may enforce the liability of the grantee, is
illogical and wrong. In view of the inconsistency and diversity
of opinion, not only in different but in the same jurisdictions, it is
to be regretted that in a jurisdiction unhampered by precedent,
principle should not have prevailed, rather than authority unsup-
ported by principle.
CONTRACT FOR AN ILLEGAL PURPOSE. ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRI-
BUTION BETWEEN WRONGDOERS. In the case of McMullen v. Hoff-
man, 75 Fed. R. 547, a contract was declared valid and enforceable in
equity by the United States District Court, which had previously,
in 69 Fed. R. 509, been held void by the same court, on the ground
that its object was illegal. The water committee of Portland, Or.,
having advertised for bids for constructing a pipe-line, the parties
to this suit entered into a secret agreement by which the defendant
on their joint account bid for the work in the name of Hoffman &
Bates, and the complainant filed a separate bid under another firm-
name; the latter bid being $49,ooo higher than the joint bid, and
not made seriously. The contract was awarded to the defendant,
who agreed in writing with the plaintiff to execute it on their joint
account, the plaintiff assisting in the work; upon which written
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agreement the plaintiff now sues to compel an account of the
profits.
The case, as first reported, came before the court upon excep-
tions to the defendant's answer, which alleged that the plaintiff had
been prepared to bid, and, but for his agreement with the defendant,
would have bid, for the work at a much lower figure than the defend-
ant; and that under said agreement the two bids were presented as
competing bids in such a way as to cause the water committee to
believe the defendant's bid to be more reasonable and advantage-
ous to the city than it actually was. Upon this answer the court
held that since the purpose of the contract was to avoid mutual
competition, thus defeating the object of the Legislature in requir-
ing the work to be awarded upon bids, it was against public policy;
that in appearing before the water committee as bona-fide competi-
tors in pursuance of the agreement the parties were guilty of a
fraud upon the city; and that the contract was, therefore, void
and the plaintiff should not recover upon that part of it which
formed the ground of his suit. Viewing the case in this light, and
regarding the plaintiff's claim as based upon an unlawful executory
contract for a division of the profits accruing to the defendant from
his contract with the city, the decision is entirely sound. Where
parties contract for an unlawful purpose the contract is void; and
a contract between bidders for an important public work to avoid
competition among them, being clearly against public policy, is for
an unlawful purpose: .Kine v. Turzer, 27 Or. 356; Atlas Nrat.
Bank v. Rohn, 71 Fed. Rep. 489 ; Brooks v. Cooper, 26 Atlan.
R. 978 ; IHunter v. Pfeiffer, io8 Ind. 197 ; People v. Stephens, 71
N. Y. 527 ; Hay's Estate, 159 Pa. 381. And when the parties
seek to perpetrate a fraud upon a third person, of course the con-
tract is void.
But the facts of the case differed materially from the defendant's
allegations. It was not shown that either party intended to bid, or
would have bid, on his own account; and the successful bid and
the resulting contract with the city were, in fact, the joint action
of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Hence the court held,
in its final decision, that the contract for co-operation between the
parties, instead of lessening competition for the public work,
served to increase the number of bidders. And however repre-
hensible their action in making two bids, one of which was merely
intended to deceive the committee to the injury of the city, this
did not constitute a fraud and render the contract illegal, because
the evidence clearly showed that it had not influenced the water
committee in the slightest. Thus the contract in suit proved to be
valid, and the plaintiff recovered. The court in its opinion goes a
step farther and declares, in effect, that even if the attempted fraud
had been successful and the contract with the city had resulted
therefrom, yet neither of the joint contractors could have disputed
on that ground the right of the other to share the profits. Because
it would still be a mere question of division of profits between two
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parties having equal rights; and , the distribution of the profits
of this contract, which are as much the property of one of the
parties as of the other, does not violate any rule of morals or of
public policy." This reasoning seems in accord with the principle
laid down in the leading case of Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. Soi,
where one partner in a vessel was obliged to divide its profits with
the other, although its voyages had been illegal ; and in Brooks v.
Afartin, 2 Wall. 7o, in which the profits of an illegal transaction
in real estate were ordered to be divided among the partners to the
scheme. But it seems contrary to the rule stated in Pomeroy's
Eq. Juri. § 401: "Generally, where two or more have entered
into a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of obtaining property in
which all are to share, and the scheme has been carried out so that
all the results of the fraud are in the hands of one of the parties, a
court of equity will not interfere on behalf of the others to aid
them in obtaining their shares, but will leave the parties in the
position where they have placed themselves." And it is submitted
that the latter rule would properly govern the case under discussion
had the parties actually committed fraud, in spite of the reasoning
of the court to the contrary.
